One of the tests for an OAuth provider could be to use the access tokens with the API that uses a user information as a parameter. If none of the APIs use user parameter, and only the access token, this test does not apply.however, using the user parameter for the current user whose access token has been retrieved should work. And that of another user with the same access token should not.
Same user could sign in from multiple clients. Since, the tokens once issued are valid for usually a duration of an hour, the provider does not limit the number of calls made in that duration. For the same reason, number of clients used by the user should not be limited. since the API's in discussion are stateless, the number of such calls doesn't matter. That said, a single client may be hogging the provider. Throttling in both cases could be helpful but should not be done on user or client basis but could be done on an API by API basis. This is one of the functions of the proxy provider. Authorization denials are severe measures and should generally be a last resort.
Also, performance test for an OAuth provider is important. If the existing load tests cover a authorizations and revokes from a user on a client repeated say thousand times in one minute and five minute intervals, it should work. Token expiry time is not specified by the user. So a test that involves a revoke prior to a re-authorization should work as an equivalent. Load test could have a variation of the different grant types for authorization. The functional tests or the build verification tests cover these and they might have other tests that could be thrown into a mix. However, single authorization and revoke of a token should be targeted in a separate run if possible. This should involve the authorization grant type that is most common. The test run that includes other kinds of tests could not only include the hand picked from the existing test cases but also include a capture of peak load traffic from external clients.
Tests could also target authorization denials from the API provider and the proxy independently. This should be visible from the responses to the authorization requests. The server property carries the source of the response. This is useful to know whether the token in invalidated because of a invalid user or an invalid client. The status code testing is not enough. Error message if any should also be tested. In the case of OAuth, providing error message that mentions an invalid user or an invalid client could be helpful. A common error message is a developer inactive message. This one is interesting because there seems to be an activation step involved.
Tests could cover spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege.
One of the weakness of this mechanism is that the APIs have to comply in a certain way. For example, none of the APIs should expose the userId parameter. If APIs expose a user parameter, it should be enforced with an alias for client usage even if those aliases are translated internally. Separation of the user parameter for API from the security mechanism that validates the user is important because security is generally considered a declarative aspect and not the code of the API.
If the two were tied together where the user information for the API is looked up via security tokens translation in the API implementation instead of outside it as a parameter, each API requiring that may need to do the same. Instead, it is probably more convenient to maintain a list of API secured by privileged access tokens. For example, if an endpoint is marked internal, it should be enforced. It could enforce by making sure that the callers are internal or that it is packaged in an assembly that is not exposed, etc. Test should verify that all APIs are marked for use only with an access token even if the tokens are not user privileged.
Same user could sign in from multiple clients. Since, the tokens once issued are valid for usually a duration of an hour, the provider does not limit the number of calls made in that duration. For the same reason, number of clients used by the user should not be limited. since the API's in discussion are stateless, the number of such calls doesn't matter. That said, a single client may be hogging the provider. Throttling in both cases could be helpful but should not be done on user or client basis but could be done on an API by API basis. This is one of the functions of the proxy provider. Authorization denials are severe measures and should generally be a last resort.
Also, performance test for an OAuth provider is important. If the existing load tests cover a authorizations and revokes from a user on a client repeated say thousand times in one minute and five minute intervals, it should work. Token expiry time is not specified by the user. So a test that involves a revoke prior to a re-authorization should work as an equivalent. Load test could have a variation of the different grant types for authorization. The functional tests or the build verification tests cover these and they might have other tests that could be thrown into a mix. However, single authorization and revoke of a token should be targeted in a separate run if possible. This should involve the authorization grant type that is most common. The test run that includes other kinds of tests could not only include the hand picked from the existing test cases but also include a capture of peak load traffic from external clients.
Tests could also target authorization denials from the API provider and the proxy independently. This should be visible from the responses to the authorization requests. The server property carries the source of the response. This is useful to know whether the token in invalidated because of a invalid user or an invalid client. The status code testing is not enough. Error message if any should also be tested. In the case of OAuth, providing error message that mentions an invalid user or an invalid client could be helpful. A common error message is a developer inactive message. This one is interesting because there seems to be an activation step involved.
Tests could cover spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service and elevation of privilege.
One of the weakness of this mechanism is that the APIs have to comply in a certain way. For example, none of the APIs should expose the userId parameter. If APIs expose a user parameter, it should be enforced with an alias for client usage even if those aliases are translated internally. Separation of the user parameter for API from the security mechanism that validates the user is important because security is generally considered a declarative aspect and not the code of the API.
If the two were tied together where the user information for the API is looked up via security tokens translation in the API implementation instead of outside it as a parameter, each API requiring that may need to do the same. Instead, it is probably more convenient to maintain a list of API secured by privileged access tokens. For example, if an endpoint is marked internal, it should be enforced. It could enforce by making sure that the callers are internal or that it is packaged in an assembly that is not exposed, etc. Test should verify that all APIs are marked for use only with an access token even if the tokens are not user privileged.
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